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Adventures of Form:  
Italian Aesthetics from Neo-Idealism to Pareyson 
 
Introduction 
When Luigi Pareyson published his seminal Estetica. Teoria della 
formatività in 1954, Italian cultural life was still dominated by 
Benedetto Croce’s aesthetics. Pareyson’s work was seen as a 
“powerful alternative” (Bubbio 2009, 6), challenging both idealism 
and positivism by adopting a hermeneutic approach in the tradition 
of Heidegger. Several decades prior, however, a persuasive, albeit 
certainly not decisively successful, alternative to Crocean 
aesthetics was already offered, and from within the same neo-
Hegelian tradition: in the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile. 
Given the nature of Gentile’s engagement in Italian politics, it 
is not surprising that his work has been shunned in Italy for a long 
time and virtually forgotten outside of Italy. Gentile is widely 
remembered as the “philosopher of fascism,” providing 
Mussolini’s regime with its most coherent theoretical defense and 
serving it loyally until he was murdered by a group of anti-fascist 
partisans in 1944, ironically after leaving a tribunal in Florence 
where he argued for the release of certain anti-fascist thinkers 
(Gregor). Croce, in contrast, was one of the most respected and 
outspoken critics of fascism. This political antagonism eventually 
led to the unraveling of what had been a long and fruitful 
friendship. The polemics exchanged between Croce and Gentile, 
however, proved to be intellectually fruitful in other respects, 
driving both to continuously sharpen their thinking, most 
considerably in the domain of aesthetics.   
In this paper I will argue that Pareyson’s articulation of art as 
formativity emerged out of an “adventure of form” whose turbulent 
trajectory was driven by the polemical dialogue of Croce and 
Gentile and its resultant innovations. More specifically, I will 
suggest that Pareyson’s alternative to Crocean aesthetics is 
indebted in no small measure to two Gentilean notions: (1) form as 
feeling, and (2) art as the “self-translation” (autotradursi) of this 
feeling. Finally, I will demonstrate that  —  this indebtedness 
notwithstanding — Pareyson overcomes the significant 
deficiencies in Gentile’s theory by dint of a powerful hermeneutic 
approach. Pareyson’s elaboration of the nature of interpretation 
provides a means of addressing art that is respectful of the claims 
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of otherness and difference with regard to which Gentile simply 
fails in alarming ways.  
 
Croce and Gentile 
It would be a highly daunting task for anyone to undertake a study 
of Gentile’s philosophy without taking into account his 
relationship with Benedetto Croce, both philosophical and 
personal. The two men were close friends and, until their political 
convictions became irreparably polarized around 1924, worked 
together “in a shared battle for cultural and civic renewal in Italy” 
(Turi 914). It is clear that while Gentile and Croce had many 
friendly philosophical disagreements — airing largely in their 
shared neo-idealistic periodical, “La Critica” — their quarreling 
assumed a nasty, polemical aspect only as the result of a profound 
break in political ideology. Croce himself “observed that his 
‘intellectual disagreement’ with Gentile, which had existed for 
‘many years,’ had been joined by ‘another of a practical and 
political nature; rather, the first [had] been converted into the 
second, and this [was] more severe’” (Turi 916). From this 
fundamental conflict of political identification grew a protracted 
and varied argument for which the field of aesthetics would 
become the most frenzied battleground.    
One major reason it is so difficult to talk about Gentile without 
Croce, especially on the topics of art and aesthetics, is because 
Gentile’s philosophy of art developed from within the firmly 
grounded Crocean aesthetic system. Both thinkers identify the 
essence of art to be feeling, but in markedly different ways: for 
Croce, art is the expression of feeling, while for Gentile it is pure 
feeling itself (De Ruggiero 493-95). In order to make sense of the 
critical upshot of this distinction, we must first come to terms with 
Croce’s understanding of intuition and expression.  
For Croce, intuition is a fundamentally distinct category of 
theoretical activity, functionally segregated from the logical and 
historical forms, although the latter is really just a sub-component 
of intuition (Croce 1992, 29-32). The aesthetic form is identified 
with the faculty of intuition and serves as the functional 
mechanism through which mere “impressions” are turned into 
“expressions.” What exactly is being “expressed”?  
In The Aesthetic (1909), Croce suggests that “feeling” 
(sentimento) — in one of its primary senses — is synonymous with 
“impression” (Croce 1992, 82). This particular sense is to be 
sharply distinguished from that of “feeling” as a variety of 
“economic activity,” that is, of wanting and desiring (Croce 1992, 
Adventures of Form: Italian Aesthetics from Neo-Idealism to Pareyson  3 
 
83). But, if an impression is understood as the result of external 
stimuli, how are we to identify it with the rather ambiguous notion 
of feeling? Prima facie, it seems that Croce is reducing feeling to 
mere sensation — the qualia produced by one’s sensory interaction 
with the world. So, then, the aesthetic is to be found in the 
expression of one’s sensory experience. As tenable as this might 
initially sound, it situates the role of art in a vague place indeed. If 
aesthetic form consists merely in the intuitive (immediate, non-
conceptual) expression of sense impressions, and the essence of art 
is just such aesthetic expression, then everyone is an artist. While 
Croce does not entirely shy away from this strange claim, he does 
problematize it by juggling a rather controversial distinction:  
 
It is customary to distinguish between the work of art which exists inside 
us and that which exists in the outside world; this way of speaking seems 
infelicitous to us, since the work of art (the aesthetic work) is always 
internal; and what is called the external work is no longer the work of art. 
(Croce 1992, 57).  
 
In this view, everyone is an artist; those who produce what are 
normally called “artworks” are something different in addition to 
their pedestrian role as artists. Art is a purely internal activity, 
while the external, practical production of works of art is to be 
relegated to the economic or practical activity of the spirit. 
Although still tacitly maintaining this distinction, Croce later 
gives a more robust role to feeling in the sphere of aesthetic 
experience. This development of a more complex and sophisticated 
treatment of art primarily arose, as Merle E. Brown suggests, out 
of the continuing debate between Gentile and Croce (Brown, ch. 
4). While Gentile could not (until La Filosofia dell’arte) ascend 
beyond an abstract approach to art that discusses its “philosophical 
implications and dialectical elements” (Brown 1966, 122) at the 
expense of any attention to its simplicity and concrete 
sensuousness, Croce was hard pressed to see in art anything more 
than the mundane internal processing of sensory data. The often-
vitriolic dialogue between Croce and Gentile, then, allowed each to 
become more like the other; it produced dialectically two effective 
syntheses of the thinkers’ respective positions, transcending their 
shortcomings and giving expression to their strengths.  
This more robust treatment of feeling first emerged in Croce’s 
1913 Brevario di estetica (Graham 120). The most succinct 
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pronouncement of Croce’s updated position, as Graham also 
observes (120), is as follows:  
 
What lends coherence and unity to intuition is intense feeling. Intuition is 
truly such because it expresses an intense feeling, and can arise only 
when the latter is its source and basis. Not idea but intense feeling is 
what confers upon art the ethereal lightness of the symbol. Art is 
precisely a yearning kept within the bounds of a representation. 
(Croce 1965, 25). 
 
Hence art, as a discrete category of the spirit, is to be regarded as 
form (the essence of which is feeling) in which any sort of content 
(particular impressions) is given expression. Gentile accepts this as 
accurate, as far as it goes. It is when Croce takes up the task of 
dissecting works of art to identify which “parts” of them should be 
rejected as non-art (Croce 1965, 27) that Gentile begins stomping 
his feet. For Croce, art is feeling expressed intuitively. The artist 
creates a “symbol,” which serves as a pre-logical representation of 
the feeling found in expression. This characterization suggests two 
important points: (1) that art must be distinguished from conscious, 
logical thought, and (2) that the feeling expressed existed at some 
point objectively free from the subjective activity of the intuition. 
Gentile strongly takes issue with both claims, as I shall illustrate 
below. 
For Gentile, feeling and thought cannot be separated. If 
pensiero pensante ‒ “thought thinking,” i.e., “concrete thinking”‒1 
is reality, and art (feeling) is the immediate subjective form of its 
dialectical development, then it follows that artistic expression can 
only exist as immanent to the ceaseless becoming of the real. What 
exactly, then, is the role of feeling in relation to thinking? A large 
part of Croce’s failure to grasp what constitutes here an original 
and innovative idea is the confusion arising from Gentile’s 
dialectic: is it a real three-term dialectic, or a two-term “pseudo-
dialectic”? If the thesis of the dialectic is subject, and the antithesis 
object, then what is the synthesis? According to Croce, it amounts 
to nothing more than a restatement of the thesis. And if the thesis is 
                                                
1 For Gentile, pensiero pensante is the ceaseless concrete process or flow of thinking of 
which pensiero pensato (“thought thought”, i.e., “abstract thought”)  —  an individual 
“thought”  —  is a halted product. Inasmuch as pensiero pensante is a dynamic process, it 
can never be grasped or pinned down for analysis. It is the unified, living principle of 
reality, which is, however, broken up in the abstract multiplicity of thoughts. This 
dialectical interplay constitutes the unfolding of reality (Gentile 1922, 41-43).   
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different from the synthesis, then at the very least it is the thesis 
and the antithesis that cannot be distinguished. Brown presents the 
problem as follows: 
 
Now it might be said that if the mediating subject, that which is 
ultimately concrete and real, recognizes the immediate subject as 
positing its own opposite but identical thought, then, this dialectic 
collapses into a pseudo-dialectic of two terms only, of the mediating 
subject and that which posits or knows. Both the immediate subject and 
the object, that is, would be thought of as the opposite of the mediating 
subject […] Conceived in such a way, they are no more clearly different 
than are Hegel’s Being and Not-Being. 
(Brown 1966, 83) 
 
This difficulty is overcome in La Filosofia dell’arte, where Gentile 
successfully establishes feeling (the essence of art) as the 
immediate subject, defined not as thought, but as “the condition of 
transcendental thought itself” (Gentile 1972, 147). This feeling, so 
defined, is what Kant called the “original unity of apperception,” it 
is “the living principle of the life of the spirit” (Gentile 1972, 146). 
Feeling, for Gentile, is the fundamental I — that which comes to 
know itself only as it posits itself as an object of thinking. The 
immediate subject (feeling) is not self-conscious; it can achieve 
such only through the mediation of thinking.  
From this definition of “feeling” Gentile comes to reject 
Croce’s formulation of “art as expression of feeling.” This relates 
to the two points mentioned above: that art is to be distinguished 
from conscious, logical thought, and that the feeling expressed 
existed at some point objectively free from the subjective activity 
of the intuition. About the latter, Gentile states, “first there is 
feeling and then the intuition of this feeling; as if such an 
immediate intuition or any spiritual activity directed upon an 
object already existent were possible!” (Gentile 1972, 156). The 
primary error, for Gentile, of Croce’s “expressivism” is that it 
takes what is nominally an aesthetics of form and turns it into an 
aesthetics of content. Because Croce “gave to feeling an existence 
of its own, independent of its function as the content of art” 
(Gentile 1972, 155), it cannot possibly function as the essence of 
the form of art. This “independent existence” is the “practical 
activity” of the spirit mentioned above. 
About the former of the two difficulties, Gentile writes: 
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[Croce’s aesthetics] began with distinguishing the theoretical activity of 
art from the theoretical activity of philosophy on the basis of their special 
content — the particular in the case of art, the universal in the case of 
philosophy. It ends with differentiating the intuitive form of knowledge, 
supposed to be peculiar to art, by allotting it a special content, namely, 
feeling, from which the lyrical character of art could be derived. But 
such a difference of content cannot be resolved into a difference of form. 
(Gentile 1972, 155) 
 
In other words, Croce’s aesthetics cannot be one of form if the 
form of artistic activity can be distinguished only by the particular 
content with which it is capable of dealing. It is a result of this odd 
position, for example, that Croce dissects the work of Leopardi, 
suggesting that he is poetic only when engaged in the “pure” 
expression of genuine feeling, relegating the pieces La Ginestra, 
Canto notturno, and A se stesso to “didacticism,” “oratory,” and “a 
notation of feelings and resolutions which do not go beyond the 
circle of the individual,” respectively (Croce 1955, 112). Thus, not 
the metaphysical poetry of T. S. Eliot, or the philosophical novels 
of Dostoevsky and Thomas Mann, or the politically driven folk-
rock music of Bob Dylan could be regarded, in accordance with 
Croce’s theory, as “works of art” in toto. 
Gentile wants to resolve this error by identifying form and 
content. The artistic form, for Gentile, is feeling, and whatever 
content one is inspired to shape “disappears in the artistic form” 
(1972, 158) and is brought to concrete realization through the 
dialectical mediation of the artwork. Simply put, when a poet sits 
down to work, she does not begin by discriminately searching her 
thoughts for sufficiently “poetic” material to which to give 
“aesthetic” expression.2 She does not have to find as her “content” 
some burning, subterranean “intense feeling,” but is, rather, 
inclined towards her preferred material — whatever it may be — 
by the feeling (which needs not, by the way, be particularly 
intense), which gives unity, infinity, and coherence to the emerging 
work.3  
                                                
2 My usage of “she” as a generic pronoun is a method of ensuring gender neutrality.  I 
find that alternating between “he” and “she” in the text is more elegant than writing “he 
or she” every time a generic pronoun is in order.   
3 The reader may here be reminded of R. G. Collingwood’s aesthetics. It has been argued 
that Collingwood was highly indebted to Gentile and Croce but failed to acknowledge the 
influence of either in any of his books. In his introduction to Gentile’s Genesis and 
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How does this dialectic of the work of art work? To answer this 
question we first must be clear that for Gentile there are really two 
matters at play here: there is art and there is artwork. The former is 
an abstraction. Art, conceived apart from any concrete work, is 
simply the abstract, immediate subjective form (the I in its thetical 
immediacy) of the spirit discussed earlier. The dialectical 
becoming of an artwork, on the other hand, is “the creation of a 
new reality because it is the creation of a personality and of the 
world that belongs to this personality, neither of which could come 
to exist without the act of thought” (Gentile 1972, 169). Just as 
Gentile’s true tripartite dialectic can be called both the “unification 
of a multiplicity” and the “multiplication of a unity,” the work of 
art consists in the simultaneous processes of resolving the 
multiplicity of thoughts into the unity of feeling, and the division 
of the unity of feeling into the multiplicity of thoughts.  
Because feeling is treated dialectically in Gentile’s system, for 
him it could not possibly serve as the circumscribed “content” of 
an artwork, that is, as something already complete in itself (and 
thus, in a sense, already “expressed”). Further, because feeling is 
an indeterminate and continuous process, it is not conceivable that 
it can “find its full expression in” any given work (Gentile 1972, 
139). It is a formative development — albeit unfolding only within 
the act of thinking — which Pareyson will come to recast in terms 
of an outwardly engaged production. Indeed, this rejection of the 
possibility of a formally complete expression leads to a major 
criticism of expressivism in general: 
 
Consider the poet who sings his sorrow: as we know, while he sings, his 
sorrow is appeased and it vanishes [reference to the preface of 
Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads, 1800]. When we read the poem we 
cannot say that we know the poet’s sorrow, which was to have been 
communicated to us; instead we find ourselves in that state of grace 
which is the result of poetry — tranquility and joy rather than suffering. 
All feelings, when we speak of them, wither and fade away. Real 
suffering not only is unable to find words […] but every joy that man 
wishes to preserve is jealously shut in his heart for fear that the envy of 
others may embitter it or the very air contaminate it. 
(Gentile 1972, 139). 
 
                                                                                                         
Structure of Society, H. S. Harris suggests that this “deliberate concealment” may be the 
source of Collingwood’s falling out of vogue in British academia (15). 
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Just because the poet is expressing sorrow, it does not follow that 
we as the reader or audience “experience” sorrow, at least not in 
the same way. As Gordon Graham puts it, “Jealousy and romantic 
love are familiar emotions expressed in literature, but I can read a 
poem expressing all-consuming jealousy in the first person […] 
without becoming to the faintest degree jealous myself, just as I 
can read a love poem without falling in love myself” (Graham 
2001, 123).  
Gentile might suggest that the underlying and formative feeling 
of jealousy supposedly driving the composition of the piece finds 
the realization of such conceptually. The poet begins with this 
singular unmediated feeling, and, through thought after thought, 
steadily assembles line after line, stanza after stanza. The unity of 
the feeling is thus broken up into numerous objectifications of its 
ipso facto ineffable resonance. Engaging the piece attentively, the 
reader squares with this multiplicity and, in the dynamic mediation 
of her thinking, affords it the necessary unity characteristic of any 
successful work of art. While the reader here does not herself feel 
“sorrow,” “jealousy” or “love,” what she does feel is the universal 
resonance of the essential feeling of the subject — the “soul,” the 
“humanity.”  
The essence of art, for Gentile is feeling. However, “feeling” 
considered as pure, immediate expression is abstract. The moment 
the artist asserts her feeling, it is broken up into multiplicity. This 
multiplicity is the objective process without which unity is 
impossible. The experience of an artwork by both artist and 
spectator consists precisely in the simultaneous breaking up of the 
work through thought, and unification of the work through feeling; 
these two aspects are inextricable. The artist translates herself 
objectively by becoming ever more self-conscious of her feeling 
through the rigorous development of thinking. In this development 
is subsumed every prerequisite for the creation of a work: 
language, theory, technique, equipment, political persuasion, moral 
sensibility, philosophical curiosity, etc.;in short, all of the elements 
rejected by Croce as non-artistic. The spectator of the work, in 
turn, translates it into his own feeling, assimilating the subjective 
reality of the artist into his own subjectivity by a similar process of 
working through the objective stage (multiplicity) into which the 
work’s feeling is divided.  
This self-translation is the very constitution of the world of the 
artwork. It does not rest as a static and already complete thing with 
which thinking beings have the liberty of coming into and going 
out of contact. For the work to live, it must be ceaselessly created 
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and recreated. The act of creation occurs every time a work is 
dynamically engaged, galvanized in thought, and translated into 
the living reality of the individual viewer, who at this moment 
renders the work universal. The “spectator,” then, is never merely 
spectator, and the other is never truly other. We must anticipate 
here that Gentile’s principle of autotradursi, while in important 
respects proto-hermeneutic, fails to sustain the gestures of 
difference, which is crucial, not only to the nature of art, but to the 
social as such, of which any aesthetic engagement is essentially a 
part. Pareyson’s implicit critique of Gentile is on this score and 
will be the theme of the following section.  
 
Gentile and Pareyson 
By now we have established the primacy of feeling in Gentile’s 
conception of art. As such, however, this notion of feeling plays an 
indispensable role in his philosophy as a whole: “Feeling itself 
then must be an intrinsic part of consciousness; it must be 
consciousness itself, in the experience of which we realize our own 
being” (Gentile 1972, 138). Art (as feeling), then, “opens up in its 
own way the Being of beings” (Heidegger 2001, 38), to quote 
Heidegger. As a fundamental principle, feeling pervades every 
effort of the spirit, driving the philosopher to realize her 
metaphysical doctrine and the scientist to reveal the truths of 
nature through empirical research just as it provides the immediate 
form by which the composer writes her symphony. “Feeling is the 
only door of the spirit” (Gentile 1972, 178). As Antimo Negri 
observes, “the concreteness of thought, the historicity of 
philosophy, and the phenomenological mood of logic all derive 
from feeling, that is, from art” (Negri 1994, 149).  
But how, exactly, does thought play into the work of art? The 
most significant way thought operates on the level of artistic 
creation, in Gentile’s theory, is through criticism. For Gentile, 
criticism is not some secondary, a posteriori reaction to aesthetic 
work, but an integral part of its creation and sustenance: “The work 
of art finds its actual existence only in criticism, just as the object 
finds its abode in the thought that thinks it” (Gentile 1972: 222). 
This organic notion of criticism is the foundation for what Brown 
regards as “the most radical idea of La Filosofia dell’arte” (Brown 
1966, 154), the aforementioned art as self-translation 
(autotradursi). Also, as we shall see, the formal adventure of self-
translation plays a significant role in the shaping of Pareyson’s 
own rejection of Crocean aesthetics. Despite this Gentilean 
inheritance, Pareyson embarks on a formative adventure of 
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hermeneutic aesthetic production that frees him from the Hegelian 
idealist trappings in which Croce and Gentile remain mired.     
Through his concept of autotradursi, Gentile finally overcomes 
actualism’s tendency to collapse into the two-term “pseudo-
dialectic.” The major principle supplying the strength for this 
success is the now clearly defined nature of the immediate subject 
(thesis) as feeling. In positing unmediated and un-self-conscious 
feeling as the first logical term in the dialectic, Gentile effectively 
provides more than merely nominal work for the synthetic moment 
to accomplish, namely, the achievement of self-consciousness.  
The fact that Gentile employs the term “feeling” (sentimento) 
rather than “sensation” (sensazione) is important. While 
“sensation” can be described in terms of the objective (some 
externally given datum) as well as the synthetic (sensing some 
externally given datum), it fails at the job of invoking immediate 
subjectivity (Brown 1966, 158). The word “feeling,” on the other 
hand, can be used to describe each moment of the dialectic. As 
examples, consider “a feeling of dread” (immediate 
subjectivity/thesis), “when he touched the bottle, he felt cold 
condensation” (objectivity/antithesis), and “I could feel her 
heartbeat as I laid my head on her chest” (mediate 
subjectivity/synthesis). With the word “feeling,” then, and by 
rejecting Croce’s early reduction of feeling to sensation, Gentile 
can define the abstract thesis of the dialectic as “the non-actual 
essence of art” (Brown 1966, 159) and at the same time use it to 
describe the essential form that is mediated and therefore 
actualized through the total dialectical expression of the artwork. 
This dialectical realization of the concrete work of art is carried out 
through the process of “self-translation.” For the remainder of this 
section I will attempt to describe as clearly as possible how this 
process unfolds. 
We begin with the immediate subject, feeling. Gentile views 
pure, unmediated feeling as essentially pleasure — it is Rousseau’s 
“sentiment of existence,” Spinoza’s objectum mentis. Pleasure is 
consciousness, but not self-consciousness: “[…] the life with 
which pleasure is to be identified is not the physiological life as 
understood by science, but the life which unfolds on the stage of 
consciousness and is consciousness itself” (Gentile 1972, 145). 
This pleasure is a complete, unfettered unity, but being an 
immediate unity, it is abstract. What is missing? Pain.  
Pleasure and pain are two absolute contradictories, but, as 
Gentile tells us, they “are in a certain sense, not really two” 
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(Gentile 1972, 142). This “certain sense” has to do with the 
dichotomous or “contrary” relationship of pleasure and pain: 
 
The relation between two contraries is dialectical, not only in an abstract 
logical sense, but in a metaphysical, that is, a real and concrete sense. 
Their duality is the opposition of a unity in itself, of something unique 
which lives, develops, comes to be, and is so far as it is not, and 
conversely. It posits itself as an identity of opposites. A pleasure which is 
stable, changeless, constant, is a dead pleasure […]. Its very life consists 
in continually arising out of its contrary. 
(Gentile 1972, 142) 
 
Thus, pain can be regarded as not-pleasure, just as pleasure can be 
called not-pain, but when they are not in opposition to one another, 
they “are both abstract” (Gentile 1972, 143). The moment the poet, 
impelled by an indomitable feeling, embarks upon the adventure of 
crafting a piece, a work of art, the pleasure of the immediate unity 
of this feeling is shattered into multiplicity. The moment she 
asserts, “I have this feeling,” the unity is broken into duality; there 
is the feeling and there is the I, as now distinguished from the 
feeling. This is the world of the poem — the objective stage in the 
dialectic. 
In contrast to Croce’s view, the object of this artistic 
“assertion” needs not be of an exclusively sensuous nature. 
Gentile’s aesthetics allows for the treatment — at the objective 
stage — of any given feeling, sensation or concept, no matter how 
cold, rigid or abstract. What distinguishes a work of art from a 
philosophical treatise, for example, is not the content (found in the 
objective articulation), but the degree to which the subjectivity, the 
feeling (as a formal principle), is dominant throughout the 
dialectical process. On the other side, a philosopher should not be 
prevented from indulging in the occasional poetic flourish or 
conceit, insofar as the subjective tone does not drown the objective 
and synthetic articulation of his argument. Thus, severely didactic 
poems, such as Lucretius’ De rerum natura, are often more readily 
accepted as philosophy than as poetry, while many of Plato’s 
dialogues, for example, are frequently praised for their poetic 
qualities over and beyond the strictly philosophical concepts being 
communicated. As Angelo De Gennaro remarks about Gentile’s 
theory, “the essence of poetry is not the complex of ideas and 
thoughts of the poet, but the mode in which these ideas and 
thoughts are represented (167). 
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Logically following the objective stage in the dialectic is the 
synthesis, the mediation, in short, the achievement of self-
consciousness. For Gentile, “every genuine poem is a synthesis of 
feeling, objective articulation, and overarching awareness” (Brown 
1970, 11). This is where criticism, as organic to the artistic 
process, comes into play. The working poet first feels, then asserts 
the feeling, then, finally, observes herself asserting the feeling. 
With every line she strives to express that nameless, consuming 
feeling entirely — to translate it through technique and language, 
to make it stand outside of her as an objective entity. But upon the 
completion of each line, she realizes that she has not succeeded. 
With the addition of every new line and every new stanza the 
preceding lines and stanzas are altered. They assume a new 
character in relation to the ever-growing structure in which they 
have life. Gentile writes: 
 
Translation, if we want to be precise, is not something supervening after 
all is over, when the expression has been completed, when the poet has 
recited his song and is silent and dead, and his song has been passed to 
others; but it is something born in the original act of expression itself and 
it develops step by step as the poet proceeds in the development of his 
theme by a progressive treatment of his fundamental motive. 
(Gentile 1972, 218). 
 
This “self-translation” is the original creative act of which all other 
intra or inter-linguistic acts of translation are but further 
developments. The objective, narrative reality of the work of art 
unfolds as the progressive and constructive division of the artist’s 
unified immediate feeling. The synthetic moment of self-
consciousness (the concrete realization of the artistic process) can 
only occur when the artist casts the aesthetic judgment of criticism 
on the multiplicity before her, thereby unifying it once more in 
what becomes the logical synthesis of the poem’s many elements 
for the expression of a singular mood. It is for this reason that 
Gentile writes, “the author who creates a beautiful work of art and 
the man who succeeds in appreciating its beauty both participate in 
the same act, which implies the identity of genius and taste” (1972, 
215). Just as the critic must possess enough of the creative genius 
of the artist to even enter the world of the work, the artist must 
share with the critic a sufficiently keen aesthetic eye to be able to 
resolutely proclaim, “Behold, it is good.” 
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It is imperative to keep in mind that, for Gentile, the work is 
only insofar as it works. In other words, the artwork, properly 
understood, is ipso facto not a thing. Hence, the originary act of 
translation undergone in the work’s composition is actuated and 
creatively retraced each time it is taken up in the aesthetic 
experience of a reader/spectator. Critic and genius inhabit the same 
formal space — whether production or “consumption” — and by 
virtue of their indissoluble intercourse constitute the opening 
through which the life of a work is to be grasped, sustained, and 
resuscitated. Every resuscitation, recomposition, or, in short, self-
translation, of a work in the act of a subject’s aesthetic enjoyment 
achieves its effective performance outside of time, or, better, in an 
eternal present. This “eternal present” is precisely the form of the 
subject’s feeling. Feeling is the spaceless place in which the 
spectator’s critic subsumes the artist’s genius into itself. If 
Montale’s Personae separatae, for example, is to truly live in my 
reading, the abstract immediacy of the poet’s feeling must be 
mediated into my feeling. I feel the uncanny transformation of 
daybreak into night (Montale 289) and, in an ironic twist, find the 
hitherto “lost sense” in which I am Montale and Montale is I. The 
poem translates itself into my own feeling, seamlessly bridging a 
span of several decades in a heroic apoplexy wherein all 
difference, all resistant otherness is spectralized, becoming at most 
an impotent, though nominally challenging, figment of my own 
relentless thinking. In the form of feeling, reader and author are 
identified.4  
But the work does not translate itself. As the reader, I translate 
it in the “objective” mediation of my own thinking, whose 
multiplicity is ultimately resolved into the unity of feeling. The 
work forms my personality and vice versa only as I retrace its 
multifarious threads to the impersonal, transcendental font in 
which all “empirically distinct” individuals are dissolved. My 
abstract immediate subjectivity becomes “concretely” mediate in 
its identification with the object (in this case, the poem, conceived 
of not as a thing, but as the poet’s own feeling objectively 
articulated). Although the unity of the poem (as the logically 
unfolded subjectivity of the poet) is preserved, such is possible 
only insofar as it is tirelessly recomposed, retranslated, in the 
transcendental functioning of the interior homo intrinsic to, and, in 
                                                
4 To “spectralize” means, literally, to turn something into a specter, a ghost.  
“Spectralizing” otherness, then, means to deny the other or the different any 
substantiality.   
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part, constitutive of, my own thinking (Gentile 1960, 98-108). 
While grabbing Gentile’s organicist baton against Croce’s — in 
Gentile’s view only nominally organic — fragmented formalism, 
also Pareyson, as we shall see, wants to repudiate the solipsistic 
subjectivism of the Gentilean aesthetic system.  
Pareyson overtly challenges the subjectivist fundament of the 
Crocean system (expression) to which Gentile’s innovations 
(feeling per se, autotradursi) are indebted by advocating a crucial 
terminological and conceptual substitution: the replacement of 
“subject” with “person.” In Estetica [1954] he writes: “The best 
guarantee against the danger of subjectivism is offered by the 
concept of person, on the basis of which, while affirming that 
every thing with which the person enters into relation must become 
interior to her, at the same time affirms its irreducible 
independence” (Pareyson 1960, 194). Thus, while otherness as 
such is overcome in the synthetic regenerativity of Gentile’s 
“mediate subject,” it is incorporated as essential to Pareyson’s 
concept of person. This point will be important for our discussion 
of conversation below. Before proceeding, however, a broad 
sketch of Pareyson’s aesthetics of formativity is in order. 
When Pareyson published Estetica. Teoria della formatività in 
1954, Italian academic culture was still largely under the sway, as 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, of Croce’s aesthetics 
(Bubbio 6). Clearly, Gentile’s infamous role as the “philosopher of 
fascism” did not help to make his contributions in the philosophy 
of art, however innovative they may have been, palatable to an 
academic world still recovering from the suffering and destruction 
engendered by Mussolini’s regime. Despite being unfashionable, 
however, Gentile’s aesthetics exercised a not insignificant 
influence on Pareyson’s own thinking, most considerably in its 
repudiation of certain problematic elements in Croce’s system.5 In 
what follows I will indicate parallels in Gentile’s and Pareyson’s 
thinking about form and then demonstrate how Pareyson’s 
aesthetics surpasses Gentile’s in its rejection of the latter’s 
arguably fascistic pitfalls. Such advances, I will argue, are made 
possible by Pareyson’s hermeneutic approach to the problem of 
form. 
                                                
5 Gentile himself was quite impressed with the depth of Pareyson’s thought. Pareyson’s 
first published paper, “Note sulla filosofia dell’esistenza,” was printed, while he was still 
a student, in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 6 (1938), 407-38, of which Gentile 
was the director. 
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Croce’s aim in writing The Aesthetic was to present “a general 
theory of philosophy and a general solution to all its problems” 
(Lyas xix). Thus, the work is concerned with the nature and 
“spiritual function” of art only insofar as it plays a role in the 
overarching metaphysical and epistemological structure of the 
philosopher’s system. Similarly, as we have seen, Gentile’s 
treatment of art is grounded in the neo-Hegelian framework of his 
“actual idealism,” within which it supplies the thetical moment of 
the tripartite dialectic, articulated as a metaphysical process. 
Pareyson’s work, in contrast, explicitly rejects such 
presuppositional system building:  
 
The philosopher who pretends to legislate in the field of art, or who 
artificially deduces an aesthetics from a pre-established philosophical 
system, or who in every case proceeds without regard to aesthetic 
experience, renders himself incapable of explaining the latter; his 
reflections cease to be philosophy and are reduced to mere wordplay. 
(Pareyson 1966, 9) 
 
For Pareyson, if one is to truly understand art, one must appraise it 
on its own terms, as it presents itself in actual experience.6  
Art presents itself, in Pareyson’s view, primarily as form, 
thought in terms of “a structured object, uniting thought, feeling, 
and matter in an activity that aims at the harmonious coordination 
of all three and proceeds according to the laws postulated and 
manifested by the work itself as it is being made” (Eco 159).7 
“Form,” then, is an activity that realizes itself in production 
(ποίησις ). Such a poietic rendering of the nature of form makes it 
impossible to distinguish it from any kind of content. The Crocean 
model of form as the internal “expression” of a subject’s feeling is 
here rejected in favor of a concrete formativity that operates in the 
intercourse of real objects in the external environment. As Eco 
observes, “The Crocean illusion of an interior figuration, whose 
                                                
6 One might object that in the passage quoted above Pareyson is at the very least 
presupposing the existence of something called “aesthetic experience.” This worry is 
easily dispelled, however, if “aesthetic experience” is understood simply as the 
experience one undergoes when engaging a work of art. Understood thusly, one need not 
assume a total homogeneity with respect to such experiences; the character of “aesthetic 
experience” would vary in accord with the variation of individual artworks, perhaps 
defined as such in virtue of their inclusion in an  “art world,” as defined by Arthur Danto.   
7 It is worth noting that Umberto Eco wrote his doctoral dissertation under Pareyson’s 
supervision.  
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physical exteriorization is only a corollary event, deliberately 
ignored one of the richest and most fruitful areas of creativity” 
(1989, 160).  
In the act of production, the artist takes her “cues” from matter 
in the physical world, presented as “a set of autonomous laws” 
which she “must be able to interpret and turn into artistic laws” 
(Eco 1989, 161). The development of the work proceeds in 
accordance with this ongoing “interpretation,” wherein the 
resistant materiality of the selected objects makes certain demands 
on the artist with respect to how it wants to be treated. This 
productive interpretation, while relying upon the sensuous voice of 
the matter for its direction, also requires the responsive ear of the 
artist, which is necessarily oriented from a particular point of view. 
Every artistic working on a given array of matter, then, results in 
the empirical articulation of the artist’s personality in the form of 
choices, traces, retraces, decisions, and reconsiderations.   
Whatever the particular theme or character of a work may be, 
the latter’s “content,” broadly construed, consists in the sensuous 
constitution of a personality. The direction or trajectory of this 
constitution — the “natural intentionality” (Eco 1989, 162) of the 
work — is delineated in the suggestive germs from which the 
formative act draws its impetus: the first line of a poem, a cursory 
brushstroke, the shadow cast by a tree on a midsummer afternoon. 
These “germs” or “cues” give a multitude of senses or directions 
that the artist must choose from and develop. The natural 
intentionality of which the artist’s intentionality is a part — insofar 
as the artist herself is part of nature — makes up what Pareyson 
calls the “forming form” (forma formante). The “forming form” of 
a work serves as the teleological guide of its own empirical 
realization; it is the dynamic, processive principle governing the 
formative development of a work from its germinal initiation 
(Pareyson 1960, 59). Once the work is shaped into a sufficiently 
autonomous, harmonious whole, it presents itself as a finished 
model, a “formed form” (forma formata), in short, the completed 
artwork. This “formed form” is to be aesthetically evaluated in 
terms of how closely it approximates the ongoing “forming form” 
to which it owes its life: “[…] the work of art draws its value from 
being in line, not with something other, but with itself; the process 
of its formation consists in the completion of the forming form in a 
formed form” (Pareyson 1960, 61). 
Like the pensiero pensante (for which see n1) of Gentile’s 
actualist system, forma formante is an active process that can only 
be appraised by recourse to its “completed” product. While 
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Pareyson does not use the Hegelian jargon, there is clearly a 
dialectical interplay between “forming form” and “formed form.” 
This interplay is most apparent from the interpretive perspective of 
the spectator/consumer, although it is equally important for the 
original productive act. In the case of the latter, most interesting 
for our purposes is the parallel to Gentile’s notion of criticism as 
creatively constitutive. Following the germinal threads suggested 
in the unfolding of a work’s “forming form,” the artist arrives at a 
“formed form” only by dint of a responsive, critical eye capable of 
discerning when the work is “autonomous and harmonious in all its 
parts” (Eco 62). Such a critical faculty is also responsible for 
determining how closely the “formed form” approximates the 
suggestions of the “forming form,” that is, for assessing its success 
or failure. The success or failure of a given work of art, of a 
“formed form,” is only intelligible when considered in terms of the 
work’s formative/normative conditions, e.g., the “forming form,” 
The “forming form,” however, is accessible only in the sensuous 
gestures and traces ossified in the “formed form.” This dialectical 
interplay is the basis of Pareyson’s theory of interpretation.    
Unlike Gentile’s pensiero pensante, “forming form” is always 
already “out there” in the world, emerging in some measure from 
an environment of objects and actions independent of the artist’s 
own thinking. In the interpretation of a “formed form,” a finished 
work, one similarly engages with an “otherness,” but in this case 
presented in the sensualized personality of the artist (again, in the 
form of choices, reconsiderations, etc.). One interprets precisely by 
“reading” the “formed form” in a critical retracing, a reactivation 
of the “forming form” process through whose originary direction 
the artist brought the work to completion. The artist gives herself 
as “content” in the form of her production. That is, every work 
carries with it the trace of a peculiar style, or, in Gentile’s 
language, “feeling,” broken up and developed through a 
multiplicitous, objective articulation. As discussed above, 
Gentile’s principle of autotradursi demands that the immediacy of 
this subjective “feeling” be translated through a mediate 
subjectivity (concrete thinking), where reader and poet, spectator 
and artist, are dissolved in the interiore homine of the 
“transcendental ego.” As we shall see, Pareyson’s hermeneutic 
approach rejects this neo-Hegelian sublation of difference.        
Two seemingly contradictory elements are necessary for an 
interpretation to successfully sustain the formativity of a work: 
freedom and faithfulness. Pareyson writes, “[…] the execution of 
an interpretation is always carried out by a single interpreter who 
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wishes to render the work as it itself desires” (Pareyson 1960, 
195). Freely adopting one point of view, one avenue of approach 
from among many, the interpreter addresses a “revelatory aspect” 
of the work in a manner appropriate to its mode of disclosure. In 
this way, Pareyson avoids the pitfalls of an extreme relativism on 
the one hand (any interpretation is the “right” interpretation), and 
an extreme dogmatism on the other (only one interpretation is the 
“right” interpretation). Every instance of proper interpretation is 
simultaneously one personal execution, and the work itself in its 
immutable otherness (Pareyson 1960, 195). Contrary to Gentile, 
the “subject” does not appropriate the work into an illusory 
“transcendental” mediation. Instead, the work appropriates the 
person, places a claim on her, demands to be attended to and 
respected in accordance with its irreducible difference. Thus, we 
are presented with a provocative sense in which interpretation is a 
lot like conversation.  
In everyday conversation, one does not have to translate the 
other’s language into “one’s own.” That is, to invoke more overtly 
the specter of Lévinas, I am not compelled — in the interest of 
genuine understanding — to assimilate “the other” into “the 
same.” Nor do I have to “represent” my interlocutor’s thoughts 
through some kind of impenetrable internal mechanism of 
“symbol” processing, however “transparent” it may be. Rather, I 
am “presented” with the other’s thoughts precisely in a mode 
seamlessly presentative of their irreducible otherness as such. This 
does not mean that I am incapable of understanding my 
interlocutor; on the contrary, it means that I am capable of 
understanding her qua other, that is, as not me and not appropriable 
by me.  
Similarly, for Pareyson, the execution of an interpretation does 
aim to translate the work of art as though it were an innocuous, 
impoverished shell waiting to be filled with meaning, or, at the 
very least, an unfinished project requiring an interpreter to 
complete it in accordance with a relative point of view (Pareyson 
1960, 201). The interpretive engagement must aim only to make 
the work live its own life. One’s appropriation by the work — or, 
by the other — is not some alien operation to which one passively 
falls prey. It is instead an openness to revelation, an attentiveness 
to the self-disclosive potentiality of form that transcends the simple 
active/passive dichotomy. According to Gentile’s theory of 
autotradursi, “the work does not exist in its determinateness and 
independence, but dissolves in an always new creative act, in 
which it is no longer possible to distinguish it from the interpretive 
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execution itself” (Pareyson 1960, 205). Understood in this way, 
every act of interpretation becomes a radical whitewashing of that 
with which one is presented, a fascistic implosion of difference 
into identity.       
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have traced the development of twentieth-century 
Italian aesthetics, albeit cursorily, from the neo-Hegelian idealisms 
of Croce and Gentile to the sophisticated hermeneutics of Luigi 
Pareyson. This historical adventure of form is not unlike the 
adventurous — because fraught with the perilous possibility of 
failure — formativity elucidated in Pareyson’s theory. The 
“formed form” of each thinker’s view precariously demands to be 
opened up according to the trajectory of its germinal cues. The 
adventure of form is a conversation in which the possibilities of 
failure and growth are always attendant. Like conversation, 
interpretation means risk: the risk of misunderstanding, confusion, 
alienation.  
The frequently vitriolic “dialogue” between Croce and Gentile, 
rife, to be sure, with misunderstanding, nevertheless helped to 
shape the path along which form became formativity and 
expression became production. If I have focused too much on 
Gentile at the expense of Croce, it is because, to my mind, the 
former represents at the same time what is most fruitful and what is 
most dangerous about neo-idealistic aesthetics. Moreover, 
Gentile’s principle of autotradursi provides a sort of proto-
hermeneutical device — its insidious flaws notwithstanding — to 
which Pareyson’s contributions are arguably indebted.  
Form, for Gentile, is feeling, but thought in terms of a 
placeless, timeless Rosetta Stone by whose dialectical adventure 
from “abstract” immediacy to “concrete,” mediate subjectivity 
everything is rendered uniformly intelligible. For Pareyson, on the 
other hand, form must be conceived of as formativity — the poietic 
activity in which objective materials are given shape, sense, and 
direction in accordance with a natural intentionality. The final 
product, the “formed form,” determined by the conclusive 
realization of one certain formative trajectory — chosen from 
among many others — must be interpreted if it is to work at all. To 
be effectively interpreted, however, the work must be respected in 
its irreducible otherness, its presentative inexhaustibility. To 
interpret a work of art is not to “represent” it, but to open oneself 
to its demands of presentation. Art is formative just as life is also 
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formative; it is open, revealing its intrinsic productive processes to 
anyone who is attentive.  
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